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I. INTRODUCTION
In Bates v. State Bar' the Supreme Court held that state regulations prohibiting the advertisement of routine legal services in
newspapers violate consumers' first amendment right to the free
flow of commercial information.2 The Court concluded that individual and societal interests in facilitating informed and reliable decisionmaking with regard to attorney services outweigh both the
1. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
2. Id. at 384.
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state's concern for the dignity of the legal profession and the state's
fear that attorney advertising might be inherently misleading.3 Although the Bates Court proscribed total suppression of attorney
advertising, it stated that reasonable restrictions on attorney advertising are constitutionally sanctioned.4 The Court recognized that
states could prohibit advertising that is false, deceptive, or misleading. The Court also noted that reasonable time, place, and manner
regulations are permissible.'
While the Bates decision established that attorney advertising
is entitled to some protection under the first amendment, the extent to which it is protected remains unclear. In limiting first
amendment protection to printed advertising of the availability and
terms of routine services,' the Bates Court left many issues unresolved.8 Perhaps the most conspicuous unresolved issue is whether
the first amendment protects attorney advertising over the broadcast media.' The Court expressly reserved this question, stating only
that the special problems associated with electronic media warrant
special consideration.10 Consequently, the bar and the lower courts
must determine the extent to which states may regulate broadcast
attorney advertising.
This Note will examine the first amendment issues that broadcast attorney advertising raises. The Note will begin with a general
discussion of the analytical approach adopted by the Supreme
Court in freedom of speech and commercial speech cases. Next, the
Note will explore the "special problems" and unique characteristics
of the broadcast media as they relate to the interests affected by
broadcast attorney advertising, concluding that the benefits afforded to consumers outweigh the potential risks created by such
advertising. The Note will also briefly consider various regulations
on broadcast advertising adopted by the bar at both the state and
federal level. Finally, the Note will examine the broader implications of broadcast advertising for the legal profession in general and
for the bar as a self-regulatory entity.
3. Id. at 363-75.
4. Id. at 383.
5. Id. at 383-84.
6. Id. at 384.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. For the purposes of this Note, the term "broadcast media" will refer to television and
radio exclusively.
10. 433 U.S. at 384.
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FIRST AMENDMENT CONSIDERATIONS

The Analytical Framework for Free Speech Issues

The first amendment expressly prohibits governmental abridgment of an individual's freedom of speech." Government action can
interfere with speech in two ways. First, abridgment occurs when
governmental regulations aim at ideas or information, singled out
for control because of the specific viewpoint expressed in the communication or because of the effects on the public produced by the
information imparted. This form of abridgment encompasses government regulations that are content-oriented, those that are directed at the communicative impact of the expressive activity. 2
Second, without aiming at the content of communications, government may unconstitutionally inhibit the flow of information and
ideas while pursuing legitimate goals. By imposing time, place, or
manner restrictions on the exercise of free expression, government
may incidentally discourage the communication of ideas or information. This form of government abridgment of speech is classified as
content-neutral and encompasses government actions which,
though aimed at the noncommunicative impact of a message, nonetheless restrict free speech."
The Supreme Court has developed two distinct approaches to
the adjudication of claims alleging governmental abridgment of free
expression. The approach used by the Court corresponds to the
nature of the abridgment. If the challenged regulation is contentoriented and aimed at the communicative impact of an exercise of
free speech, the Court employs an analysis under which a regulation
is upheld only if the government shows that it is necessary to further
"a compelling state interest," or that the speech being suppressed
falls within the Court's traditional litany of unprotected speech.'
Under this analysis, the Court requires a particularly close nexus
between ends and means. A challenged statute must clearly be an
efficacious means of achieving permissible objectives and must be
narrowly drawn to avoid unnecessarily constricting the flow of information and ideas." Furthermore, one commentator has noted that
11. The first amendment provides: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CoNsT. amend. I.
12. See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
13. See, e.g., Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
14. For an expanded discussion of the two approaches utilized by the court to resolve
freedom of speech issues, see L. TRIBE, AMERIcAN CONSTrrTUONAL LAw 580-88 (1978).

15. See note 37 infra.
16. See, e.g., Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97 (1940).
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governmental suppression is conclusively deemed unnecessary when
"the harm feared could be averted by a further exchange of ideas.""
In other words, whenever "more speech" could eliminate the potential injury the government is seeking to prevent, more speech is the
constitutionally mandated remedy." Finally, when the Court determines that challenged regulations are content-based, government
may not justify such regulations by a claim that the content of the
expression has been adequately voiced by other speakers or that the
expression may be voiced in another place, at another time, or in
another manner." Second, if the challenged law is found to be
content-neutral, the Court will weigh the relative values of freedom
of expression and the government's regulatory interest at issue.
Under less exacting scrutiny, a regulation reasonably prescribing
time, place, or manner restrictions will withstand a first amendment challenge if it does not unjustifiably constrict the flow of information and ideas. 20
B. FirstAmendment Protectionfor Commercial Speech
Until recently, commercial speech 21 was considered completely
outside the scope of first amendment protection. This "commercial
speech" exception originated in Valentine v. Chrestensen,2 2 in which
the Court upheld the enforcement of a city ordinance prohibiting
distribution of commercial leaflets in the streets. The violator was
a submarine exhibitor who had appended a protest message to
handbills advertising his exhibition. The Supreme Court distinguished advertising from ideological expression and held that the
first amendment imposes no restraint on a state's power to regulate
purely commercial advertising." In the Chrestensen decision the
Court established a "primary purpose" test, which provided that if
the motive for a communication is primarily profit-oriented then
the speech is commercial and not protected by the first amendment.24
The unsatisfactory results worked by perfunctory application of
the commercial speech exception soon became evident.2 For exam17. L. TRIBE, supra note 14, at 602-03.
18. Id.
19. See, e.g., Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 757 n.15 (1976).
20. L. TRmE, supra note 14, at 582.
21. For purposes of this discussion, "commercial speech" is defined as speech of any
form that advertises a product or service for profit or for business purposes.
22. 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
23. Id. at 54.
24. Id. at 55.
25. One member of the Chrestensen Court, Justice Douglas, later referred to the
Chrestensen decision as "casual, almost offhand," and as one that "has not survived reflec-
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ple, in a subsequent case the Court attempted to modify the harsh
effect of Chrestensen by adopting a more restrictive test requiring
that the content of the speech, as well as its purpose, must be
commercial for the commercial speech exception to apply." In another case, the Court denied protection, but avoided application of
the commercial speech exception, basing its denial on the discriminatory nature of the challenged communication."
The gradual retreat from the commercial speech exception was
confirmed in Bigelow v. Virginia,"8 in which the Court struck down
the enforcement of a state law prohibiting advertisement of abortion
referral service information. Recognizing that commercial speech
was entitled to some first amendment protection, 29 the Court balanced the state's justification for the ban against the public interest
in the factual content of the advertisement to determine the extent
of protection required."0 Although the Bigelow decision unquestionably limited the Chrestensen commercial speech doctrine,3' the public interest aspect of the advertisement and the Court's utilization
of a balancing analysis left uncertain the degree of protection extended to commercial speech.32
Subsequently, in VirginiaState Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council,3 3 the Court reevaluated the first
amendment interest served by commercial speech and explicitly
repudiated the commercial speech doctrine. Recognizing that both
individual consumers and society as a whole have strong interests
3
in the free flow of commercial information,"
the Court held that
drug price advertising by pharmacists, as purely commercial speech
3
under both the purpose and content tests,"
contained information
valuable to consumers and was therefore entitled to protection
tion." Commarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 514 (1959) (Douglas, J., concurring).
26. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964).
27. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376
(1973). In PittsburghPress the Court described the newspaper employment listings classified
by gender as "classic examples of commercial speech." Id. at 385. The Court nonetheless
denied the listings first amendment protection, not on the basis of the commercial speech
doctrine, but rather on the ground that they furthered sexual discrimination in hiring, an
illegal activity. Id. at 388.
28. 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
29. Id. at 826.
30. Id. at 826-27.
31. The Court construed the Chrestensen decision as having established only that a
state may reasonably regulate the manner, as distinguished from the content, of commercial
advertising and not that commercial speech is "unprotected per se." Id. at 819-20.
32. See Comment, FirstAmendment Protectionfor CommercialAdvertising: The New
ConstitutionalDoctrine, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 205, 218 n.87 (1976).
33. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
34. Id. at 770.
35. Id. at 760-61.
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under the first amendment."
The Virginia Pharmacy Court did not treat commercial advertising in the traditional categorical terms of protected and unprotected speech." Instead, the Court employed a practical balancing
test, weighing the countervailing interests of the consumer and the
state to determine the degree of protection to be accorded purely
commercial advertising. The Court concluded that the public's
right to the free flow of commercial information outweighed the
state's interest in maintaining the professionalism of licensed pharmacists.38
With the precedent established in Virginia Pharmacy, the extension of first amendment protection to attorney advertising in
Bates v. State Bar" was foreseeable. Indeed, the majority in Bates
viewed the decision as one flowing "a fortiori" from the decision in
Virginia Pharmacy." The Court began its analysis of the first
amendment issue with the assumption that Virginia Pharmacy
would control unless the respondent bar association could show that
the differences between attorney service advertising and pharmacist
product advertising brought different constitutional considerations
into play.4'
Emphasizing the diverse and highly individualized nature of
legal services, the bar association contended that even the most
routine legal problems raised questions unique to each case. Advertising prices for specific services would therefore be misleading, according to respondent, since the ultimate costs of the required legal
services could not be ascertained accurately prior to consultation
with the client.4 2 The bar association also pointed out that predetermined fees would induce the performance of substandard legal services because attorneys would render a standardized package of services without regard to the particular needs of the client." The Court,
while recognizing that some legal services require specific tailoring
36. Id. at 762.
37. Traditionally, the Court has employed a rigid categorization analysis to adjudicate
the constitutionality of regulations found to suppress free expression. Under this approach a
regulation is upheld only if the suppressed speech is found to fall within one of several
categories of unprotected speech recognized by the Supreme Court as being amenable to state
regulation. These unprotected categories include speech classified as obscenity, libel, fighting
words, and speech constituting a clear and present danger to the public. For a general
discussion of the various categories of unprotected speech and a listing of cases decided under
this analysis, see J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 728-37, 780-93,
831-47 (1978).

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

425 U.S. at 770.
433 U.S. 350 (1977).
Id. at 365.
Id.
Id. at 372.
Id. at 378.
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to the needs of a client, nevertheless concluded that certain services
are so markedly similar to other services and so routine that their
prices may be advertised without being misleading." The Court also
noted that the bar may formulate guidelines as to what services
must be included in a standardized package, and that any discrepancies in the expectations of the client and the attorney regarding
the services included in a fixed-price package could be settled at the
initial consultation."
The bar association also asserted that, considering the size and
multiplicity of the legal profession, and the varied nature of legal
services, the difficulties of adequately policing the advertising community would be prohibitively difficult." The Court dismissed this
concern by stating that the argument denigrates the character and
integrity of the individuals within the profession and implies that
attorneys will take unscrupulous advantage of the opportunity to
advertise." The Court's response reflected its belief that most attorneys will advertise with careful regard for the truth, enabling state
bars effectively to prevent misconduct.
Resurrecting arguments presented in Virginia Pharmacy, the
bar association also cautioned that attorney advertising would commercialize the profession by undermining an attorney's sense of
dignity and the service orientation of the profession." In addition,
the association argued that the overemphasis on profit would ultimately erode the client's trust in his attorney. The Court rejected
these arguments, stating that they were founded on the fallacious
notion that attorneys should not acknowledge that they earn their
living by practicing law.4 In response to the bar's additional contention that advertising would produce undesirable economic effects,
the Court admitted that some costs would inevitably be passed to
consumers, but noted that advertising might result in lower prices
by stimulating competition." The Court also rejected the bar's assertion that the cost of advertising would impede the entry of young
lawyers into the legal market," postulating that, in fact, advertising
could be instrumental in helping them penetrate the field of established attorneys. 52 The majority also pointed out that advertising,
by eliminating potential clients' fears of high costs and inability to
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 372-74.
at 373 n.28.
at 379.
at
at
at
at

368.
368-69.
377.
377-78.
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find qualified attorneys, would benefit the profession by increasing
the utilization of legal services to pursue valid claims."3
The Bates Court's analysis was based on principles established
in Virginia Pharmacy: that advertising is valuable in a free enterprise economy, serving both the individual consumer and society at
large by providing information fostering proper allocation of resources and facilitating enlightened public decisionmaking;r" that
because it serves important first amendment interests, advertising
should not be absolutely prohibited unless the dangers it creates are
clearly greater than the harm caused by its prohibition;" and, that
without a showing that the danger outweighs possible benefits, the
first amendment forbids prohibition. Adopting the balancing approach used in Virginia Pharmacy,the Court examined the relative
harms and benefits of the ban on attorney price advertising and the
free flow of such commercial information.56 The decision resulting
from this balancing process reflected the Court's perception of the
public's disillusionment with the profession and the growing sentiment that the prohibition of advertising not only impedes the efficient distribution of legal services, but does so without moral and
public interest justification. 7 The Court's holding that the consumer's interest in the free flow of commercial information outweighed the interests of the state was based on empirical evidence",
indicating that the restrained, truthful advertising of legal services
would be more beneficial to individuals and to society at large than
the state's absolute proscription against such advertising.
The Court thus concluded that the total ban on attorney advertising was violative of the first amendment. The Court explicitly
stated, however, that certain restrictions on attorney advertising
would be permissible.59 False, deceptive, or misleading advertising
may be proscribed and higher standards of truthfulness may be
applied to commercial speech than to other forms. 0 Furthermore,
the complexity of legal services and the public's lack of sophistication concerning legal services may warrant even higher standards to
avoid misleading consumers." The Court also noted that assertions
53. Id. at 376, 377 n.35.
54. Compare id. at 364-65 with Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 765 (1976).
55. Compare 433 U.S. at 379 with 425 U.S. at 770.
56. 433 U.S. at 368-79.
57. Id. at 370-71.
58. The Court relied heavily on the results of surveys and statistical reports in its
evaluation of the potential harms and benefits of attorney advertising. See, e.g., id. at 370
nn. 22 & 23, 376 n.33.
59. Id. at 383.
60. Id.
61. Id.
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not amenable to verification, such as claims concerning the quality
of legal services, may be prohibited as misleading.62 Advertising of
illegal transactions may be totally prohibited." And finally, the
Court noted that reasonable time, place, and manner regulations
were permissible."
The Court limited the scope of its holding so that only the
absolute prohibition of legal advertising was deemed unconstitutional and only a printed, truthful statement of the price of legal
services was held to be constitutionally protected. 5 Whether the
states will limit Bates to its narrow holding remains to be seen. One
of the most conspicuous issues left unresolved by the Bates decision
is whether attorney advertising over the broadcast media is entitled
to first amendment protection. The Court, treading lightly on the
issue, stated only that the special problems associated with electronic media advertising would warrant special consideration in the
promulgation of regulations on attorney advertising." Implicitly
recognizing the issue as one appropriate for state regulation, the
Court invited participation by the bar in the promulgation of rules
"assuring that advertising by attorneys flows both freely and
cleanly.""
The Unique Characteristicsof the Broadcast Media-Their
Impact on FirstAmendment Analysis
The Supreme Court in a recent opinion expressly acknowledged
that, of all forms of communication, broadcasting has received the
most limited first amendment protection." Broadcast speech has
been viewed as being especially amenable to governmental regulation in the public interest." Various reasons exist for greater regulation of broadcasted speech than for other forms of speech. Traditionally, increased governmental regulation has been justified by
the limited nature of the broadcast spectrum and the need to avoid
congestion of the broadcast channels. 0 Public ownership of the airwaves has also been advanced as a rationale for the more limited
protection accorded broadcasted speech."
C.

62. Id. at 383-84.
63. Id. at 384.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 384.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 98 S. Ct. 3026, 3040 (1978).
69. Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582, 584 (D.D.C. 1971), aff'd sub
nom., Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Acting Att'y Gen., 405 U.S. 1000 (1972).
70. See, e.g., National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 226 (1943);
National Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 516 F.2d 1101, 1112 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
71. See 5 Omo N. U. L. REv. 153, 161 (1978).
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Perhaps the strongest justification for subjecting broadcasted
speech to more stringent regulation than other forms of communication, specifically printed communication, is that while printed messages must be read-an affirmative act-for the informational content of the communication to be conveyed, broadcast messages are
"in the air" and thus require no active participation by the listener;
indeed, the message can be conveyed subliminally.7 2 The Supreme
Court recently recognized the capabilities and powers of the electronic media, stating that "the broadcast media have established a
uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all Americans."n Presumably, it is this characteristic of electronic communication that
motivated the Court in Virginia Pharmacy, when extending first
amendment protection to printed drug price information, to note
that "the special problems of the electronic broadcast media" were
not involved in that decision.74 Thus the Court in Bates cautioned
that the special problems associated with electronic media advertising would warrant special consideration in the promulgation of regulations on attorney advertising.75
In addition to the general characteristics of the broadcast
media which render broadcasted speech especially amenable to regulation, there are several special problems that have been associated with attorney advertising over the broadcast media. These
special problems include the inherent emphasis of style over substance of the message,7 the transitory nature of the communication,
the difficulty of monitoring the advertising activity and enforcing
compliance with ethical standards, and the inadequacy of after-thefact policing of broadcasted advertisements. Moreover, arguments
can be made that broadcasted attorney advertising would be misleading to the public and would be detrimental to legal professionalism. The constitutional status of broadcasted attorney advertising,
then, depends upon the degree to which the distinctive characteristics of the broadcast media, both those associated with the media
in general and those associated with attorney advertising in particular, affect the balance of the interests at stake.
(1) Broadcast Attorney Advertising in the Balance
The Supreme Court has indicated in Virginia Pharmacy and
72. 333 F. Supp. at 586.
73. 98 S. Ct. at 3040.
74. 425 U.S. at 773.
75. 433 U.S. at 384.
76. ABA Code of Professional Responsibility Amendments, Report to the Board of
Governors of the Task Force on Lawyer Advertising, 46 U.S.L.W. 1, 2 (August 23, 1977)
[hereinafter cited as ProposedAmendments].
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Bates that commercial speech issues are properly resolved by applying a balancing test in which the values of the competing interests
are compared. While Bates and Virginia Pharmacy articulated the
factors to be considered in determining the extent to which the first
amendment protects printed commercial speech by professionals,
advertising over the broadcast media raises new considerations that
must be factored into the balance.
(a) The Case in Favor of BroadcastAttorney Advertising
The broadcast media have been recognized as the most effective and pervasive channels of mass communication. Referring to
the broadcast media collectively, the court in Business Executives'
Move for Vietnam Peace v. FCC" stated:
[The broadcast media] function as both our foremost forum for public speech and our
most important educator of an informed people. In a populous democracy, the only
means of truly mass communication must play an absolutely crucial role in the processes
of self-government and free expression, so central to the First Amendment."

The superior communicative value of the broadcast media in
general and of television in particular should be an important consideration in the Supreme Court's balancing of the interests affected
by broadcast attorney advertising. The following data is illustrative
of the results of studies examining the pervasiveness of television.
In 1977 an estimated 98 percent of all households owned television
sets, and February 1978 surveys indicated that the average television viewing time in these households was over seven hours per
day." Statistics also reveal that television is considered to be the
most authoritative medium." Furthermore, studies indicate that
television is the most effective advertising medium. In an advertising effectiveness study conducted for the Illinois State Bar Association in 1977, an informational advertising campaign was run for
three weeks in the newspaper and on radio and television. Subsequent samples of the population revealed that 71 percent of the
persons contacted recalled seeing advertisements on television, but
only 39 percent recalled seeing them in newspapers." The demonstrated superior capacity of the broadcast media to disseminate
important commercial information to the public should be a factor
77. 450 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1971), rev'd on othergrounds sub nom., Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
78. 450 F.2d at 653-55.
79. The Television Bureau of Advertising, Report on the Scope and Dimensions of
Television Today (1978) (copy on file with the Vanderbilt Law Review).
80. Id.
81. State Bar of California, Final Report and Recommendations of the Special Committee on Lawyer Advertising and Solicitation 17 (Nov. 1978) (copy on file with the Vanderbilt
Law Review).
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favoring a determination that attorney advertising over the broadcast media requires first amendment protection.
In assigning a value to the pervasiveness and effectiveness of
the broadcast media, the Court should also consider the need for
widespread dissemination of information pertaining to legal services. In 1974 a special committee of the American Bar Association
(ABA) estimated that effective access to the judicial machinery was
being denied to a vast majority of the population. 82 The underutilization of legal services has been attributed primarily to the public's
ignorance of the nature and availability of legal services and the fear
of prohibitively high cost for such services.13 The public's need for
information was strikingly confirmed in one study that revealed
that middle-class consumers overestimated attorneys' fees by 91
percent for the drawing of a simple will, by 340 percent for reading
and giving advice on a two-page installment sales contract, and by
123 percent for thirty minutes of consultation and general advice.84
The data also disclosed that 75 percent of those sampled had not
seen an attorney on any personal matter within the previous five
years; and that 75 percent had signed an installment sales contract
within the previous five years. 5 These results suggest that, while it
is arguably difficult to establish accurate fixed prices for routine
services, advertised price information would at least provide the
consumer with a general indication of the costs, availability, and
nature of legal services. Broadcast attorney advertising is the most
effective means of disseminating such information.
In addition to expanding the general public's knowledge of the
price and availability of legal services, broadcast attorney advertising provides the only means of protecting certain consumer's first
amendment rights to receive commercial information. A significant
segment of the population is functionally illiterate" and consequently depends upon the broadcast media as an important source
of information. Use of the electronic media would ensure that individuals who do not normally read print media or who have print
handicaps will be provided some means of receiving information
regarding the nature, terms, and availability of legal services.
When determining the degree of protection to be accorded
82. Jackson, A Brief Review of Existing Data on the Extent of Legal Needs Among
Middle Income Americans, in ABA NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON PREPAm LEGAL SERVICES, 8-18
(P. Murphy ed. 1974).
83. 433 U.S. at 376; accord, Frierson, Legal Advertising, 2 BARRISTER 6, 8 (Winter 1975).

84. 433 U.S. at 376.
85. Id.
86. "A 1975 report by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare indicates that
approximately one-fifth of the adults in this nation are functionally incompetent in basic
skills, including reading skills." ProposedAmendments, supra note 76, at 2 n.*.
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broadcast attorney advertising, the Court should also consider the
policies and principles established in a series of cases addressing
group legal services. In NAACP v. Button87 and several subsequent
decisions,"' the Court established that participation in the judicial
system is a form of constitutionally protected expression essential
to the first amendment guarantee for redress of grievances."9 Implicit in these holdings is the Court's recognition of the constitutional significance of the right of access to the courts and the critical
role that communications by lawyers to potential clients play in a
judicial system that, in theory, is available to all. Underlying these
decisions is a strong policy statement by the Court favoring the
dissemination of information regarding the availability of legal services. Indeed, one commentator has noted that Button and its progeny represent the "adoption of the principle that actions which
facilitate participation in the legal system are deserving of substantial first amendment protection."" Recognition of this principle favors protecting broadcast attorney advertising because of its capacity to facilitate participation in the legal system by communicating
information on which individuals can base intelligent decisions
about their legal rights and needs.
(b) The Case Against BroadcastAttorney Advertising
The broadcast media have been recognized as offering more
opportunities for deceptive or misleading commercial practices than
other channels of communication." The increased potential for misleading advertising has been attributed to the ability of the broadcast media to transmit messages subliminally and the inherent
emphasis on style over substance in broadcast communications.
Furthermore, misimpressions created by statements over the broadcast media may be more difficult to discern. 3 These considerations
87. 371 U.S. 415, 428-31 (1963).
88. See, e.g., United Transp. Union v. State Bar, 401 U.S. 576 (1971); United Mine
Workers v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v.
Virginia State Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964).
89. See note 11 supra.
90. Note, Don't Be Confused-We Don'tBait and Switch! A FirstAmendment Analysis
of Lawyer Advertising, 21 Sr. Louis U. L.J. 125, 130 (1977).
91. For a general discussion of the increased capability of televised advertising to deceive, see Elrod, The Federal Trade Commission: Deceptive Advertising and the ColgatePalmolive Company, 12 WASHBURN L.J. 133 (1973).
92. See generally Reed, The PsychologicalImpact of TV Advertising and the Need for
FTC Regulation, 13 AM. Bus. L.J. 171 (1975).
93. Brief for Petitioner [Massachusetts Bar Ass'n] at 5, in Support of its Petition To
Adopt the Amendments to the Disciplinary Rules in the Code of Professional Responsibility
as set forth in Supreme Judicial Court Rule 3:22 as Recommended by the Massachusetts Bar
Association (April 12, 1978) (copy on file with the Vanderbilt Law Review).

768

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32:755

may lead to the conclusion that attorney advertising over the broadcast media is inherently misleading or that the potential for misimpressions is so high that broadcast attorney advertising should be
totally prohibited."
An analogous situation exists at present in the controversy surrounding a Federal Trade Commission (FTC) proposal to limit and
in some cases ban televised advertising aimed at children." Among
the arguments favoring such a proposal are the allegations that such
advertising is misleading and unfair and therefore unprotected by
the first amendment." These allegations are based on the inability
of young children to understand the actual intent of an advertisement and on their apparent inability to distinguish between commercial messages and noncommercial programming." The FTC is
currently holding hearings to inquire further into the potential dangers of product advertising directed toward children."
Concededly, the interests implicated in the proposed prohibition against broadcast advertising aimed at children are distinguishable from those relevant to a proposed ban of attorney advertising over the broadcast media. Adult consumers, unlike young
children, are capable of assessing the intent of commercial messages
and can discriminate between commercial and noncommercial
broadcast communications. Nonetheless, broadcast advertising to a
public unsophisticated in matters relating to legal services may be
as misleading as advertising directed to children. Advertising over
the broadcast media is more likely to influence consumers who cannot read and those who have little or no understanding of the nature, terms, and availability of legal services. These consumers may
have difficulty in evaluating an advertisement for legal services and
in understanding the implications of any disclaimers or explanations qualifying the commercial. Moreover, in some cases the adult
consumer may not recognize the commercial nature of the message,
viewing it as a type of public service announcement.
The FTC's proposed ban on televised children's advertising is
also relevant to the issue of broadcast attorney advertising because
it indicates the Commission's willingness to treat the broadcast
media differently from other media when it determines that the
characteristics of the broadcast media pose dangers unique to that
94. Id. at 6.
95. BROADCASTING, Jan. 22, 1979, at 24.
96. Id. at 25. See generally Thain, Suffer the Hucksters To Come Unto the Little
Children? PossibleRestrictions of Television Advertising to Children Under Section 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act, 56 B.U. L. REv. 651 (1976).
97. See Thain, supra note 96, at 674.
98. See BROADCASTING, supra note 95, at 25.
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media. A similar position was adopted in CapitalBroadcastingCo.
v. Mitchell" in which the Supreme Court affirmed without opinion
the district court's decision upholding a flat statutory ban on the
advertising of cigarettes over any medium of electronic communications subject to Federal Communications Commission jurisdiction.
While the value of Capital Broadcasting as precedent for analysis
of first amendment issues has been diminished by the Court's repudiation of the Chrestensen commercial speech doctrine upon which
the decision in Capital Broadcastingwas based,'" the ban on televised cigarette commercials is still in effect. There is some question,
however, concerning its current validity under the first amendment.
Indeed, Justice Rehnquist concluded in his dissent in Virginia
Pharmacy that televised cigarette advertising may no longer be
completely prohibited under the present treatment of commercial
speech."0 ' Nevertheless, despite the fact that the Court's approval.
of the disparate treatment of broadcast media was not based on first
amendment considerations, the district court did articulate various
characteristics of broadcast media that provided a rational basis for
disparate treatment. 0 2 The court focused primarily on the potential
of broadcast media to influence young people by persuading them
to purchase and smoke cigarettes, an activity dangerous to their
health.o3 Language in the case suggests, therefore, that even if a
balancing test were applied to the cigarette ban issue, the interest
of the government in protecting the welfare of the public may outweigh the first amendment interests in permitting the dissemination of certain information over broadcast media, which have
unique capacities to mislead through persuasion.
Other objections to attorney advertising over broadcast media
relate to the transitory nature of broadcast communications. 04 Because the broadcast audience is continuously tuning in and out,
prior or subsequent warnings, disclaimers, or explanations may be
ineffective to protect the consumer from being misled.'" Similarly,
the immediate effect of broadcast messages arguably may render
after-the-fact policing inadequate to ensure compliance with the
designated standards.
99. 333 F. Supp. 582 (D.D.C. 1971), aff'd sub nom., Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Acting
Att'y Gen., 405 U.S. 1000 (1972).
100. See text accompanying notes 33-36 supra.
101. 425 U.S. at 781.
102. 333 F. Supp. at 585-86.
103. Id.
104. See Brief for Petitioner [Florida Bar Ass'n] at 13, in Support of its Petition To
Adopt the Amendments to the Florida Bar Code of Professional Responsibility (Advertising)
(1978) (copy on file with the Vanderbilt Law Review).
105. Id.
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Another possible objection to broadcast attorney advertising is
that such advertising will undermine the lawyer's sense of professionalism and the public's dignified image of lawyers. Broadcast
advertising, through association with the hucksterism so prevalent
on broadcast media, might result in over-commercialization of the
practice of law. The service orientation of the legal profession would
thus be underemphasized, while profit-seeking motives and the
appearance of self-aggrandizement by members of the bar would be
overemphasized.
Finally, the cost of advertising over the broadcast media may
also warrant special consideration in the attorney advertising
area.o 6 Presumably, the high costs of broadcast advertising would
ultimately be passed on to clients in the form of increased fees.
Moreover, the high costs of broadcast advertising may create an
additional impediment for the new attorney attempting to enter the
legal market.
(c)

Analysis

While the degree to which broadcast attorney advertising is
entitled to first amendment protection has not been conclusively
determined, a balancing of the relevant interests suggests that a
total prohibition of attorney advertising over electronic media
would have to overcome strong constitutional objections. The consumer's first amendment right to receive commercial information
concerning legal services has been established by the Supreme
Court. Furthermore, the public's need for information allowing for
more enlightened decisionmaking with regard to the purchasing of
attorney services is well-documented. Finally, broadcast media
have demonstrated a unique capacity to disseminate information
pervasively and effectively. These three factors weigh heavily in
favor of according broadcast attorney advertising some first amendment protection, especially since the arguments against broadcast
attorney advertising do not withstand close analysis.
First, the criticisms leveled at the transitory nature of broadcast communications and the inadequacy of after-the-fact policing
are weakened in view of the fact that the predicted dangers may be
averted by the promulgation of appropriate regulations. The danger
that the consumer may lose the protection of any disclaimers or
warnings may be avoided in television advertising, for example, by
regulations requiring that the disclaimer appear on the screen
106. See, e.g., Order of the Supreme Court of Appeals of the State of West Virginia,
EC 2-2, Approval of Amendments, Additions and Deletions to the Code of Professional
Responsibility Adopted by the Said State Bar at its Regular Annual Meeting on April 14,
1978 (Oct. 18, 1978) (copy on file with the Vanderbilt Law Review).
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throughout the advertisement. Furthermore, the problems of afterthe-fact policing could be significantly diminished, if not eliminated, by requiring that the commercial be prerecorded and one
copy sent to a review committee of the governing bar association.,"
Second, the Supreme Court in Bates stated that price advertising should have no adverse effects on the professionalism or dignity
of practicing attorneys.0 8 It is difficult to draw constitutional distinctions between dignified broadcast advertising and advertising of
the same information in print. Significantly, the American Bar Association and various state and local bar associations use radio and
television to advertise information regarding legal referral services
through public service announcements."' In a similar vein, numerous experiments are in progress or have been proposed for direct
coverage of judicial and legislative proceedings by electronic
media."10 Furthermore, "candidates for public office, including
judges, attorneys general, and prosecuting attorneys, have used the
electronic media with effectiveness and dignity.""' Admittedly,
broadcast advertising should not be used to present professional
services advertisements in a manner similar to the presentation of
advertisements for commercial products, which rely heavily upon
dramatizations and jingles. Such practices arguably would have an
adverse effect on the dignity of the profession. Nonetheless, restrictions short of a total ban could be promulgated restricting the manner in which information about attorney services may be presented.
In addition, advertising over broadcast media may in fact improve
the attitude of the public toward the profession by demonstrating
the efforts of the bar to reach out to the population it ostensibly
serves.
The argument that the increased costs of broadcast advertising
will produce undesirable economic effects on both clients and young
attorneys is unpersuasive and is of little relevance to first amendment considerations. The Supreme Court has recognized that dissemination of price information tends to reduce prices through competition.I"2 This belief has been a basic axiom of the American market system. Competitive price advertising should therefore produce
lower prices in the legal market just as it has done in other markets.
107. See text accompanying note 138 infra.
108. 433 U.S. at 368-72.
109. See Comments by Neal Van Ells, President of the Ohio Association of Broadcasters, on the Proposed Emergency Rules Relating to Lawyer Advertising as Recommended by
the Ohio State Bar Association at 6 (Oct. 24, 1977) (copy on file with the Vanderbilt Law
Review).
110. Id. at 5.
111. Id. at 6.
112. 433 U.S. at 377.
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Furthermore, if a young attorney can expect a reasonable response
by consumers to his broadcast advertisement, he presumably would
consider the investment made in publicizing his new practice a
sound one.
The assertion that broadcast attorney advertising should be
banned because such advertising would be inherently misleading or
because the potential for deception over the broadcast media is too
pervasive to control appears to be the only contention presenting a
sound basis for objection. Nonetheless, the increased tendency of
broadcast advertising to deceive or mislead has occurred when
broadcast media are used primarily as sources of persuasion and
only secondarily as sources of information. 13 Attorney advertising
presumably has the primary objective of informing consumers of the
availability, nature, and cost of legal services. Any persuasive effects are or should be incidental and may be controlled reasonably
by the bar's promulgation and strict enforcement of appropriate
guidelines and regulations. For example, if a regulation provided
that permissible televised attorney advertising was limited to the
reading by an unseen announcer of a screened, printed commercial
message, complete with any required disclaimers, broadcasted advertisements would seem to pose no greater potential for deception
than authorized printed advertisements. Therefore, since the Court
in Bates concluded that some services can be advertised in print
without being misleading,"' it would be consistent for the Court to
find that some services can be broadcast without being misleading
if restrictions appropriate to the media are imposed."'
In the absence of an authoritative ruling by the Supreme Court
regarding the constitutional status of broadcast attorney advertising
and until empirical data on the various effects of such advertising
can be accumulated, the results of a balancing test to determine
whether broadcast attorney advertising is protected by the first
amendment must be speculative in nature. Examination of the
competing interests suggests, however, that the individual's right
and need to receive information concerning legal services and the
superior capacity of the broadcast media to communicate such information to the consumer outweigh the potential dangers caused
by broadcast attorney advertising. Unless or until actual danger is
demonstrated, a ban on the dissemination of truthful information
113. See Elrod, supranote 91.
114. 433 U.S. at 372.
115. The Court in the Bates opinion stated: "We do not foreclose the possibility that
some limited supplementation, by way of warning or disclaimer or the like, might be required
of even an advertisement of the kind ruled upon today so as to assure that the consumer is
not misled." Id. at 384.
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about legal services over broadcast media should not withstand constitutional challenge.
III. STATE AND FEDERAL BAR POSITIONS ON BROADCAST ATTORNEY
ADVERTISING

A. American Bar Association
The Board of Governors of the American Bar Association
(ABA) established a Task Force on Lawyer Advertising shortly before the Bates decision was handed down by the Supreme Court."'
In response to the Court's directive in Bates that the bar ensure the
free and clean flow of attorney advertising, the Task Force drafted
two proposals for amendments to Canon Two of the ABA Code of
Professional Responsibility, which refers to the lawyer's obligation
to assist the legal profession in fulfilling its duty to make legal
counsel available. Both of these proposals have been circulated for
consideration among the highest courts of all the states and appropriate state regulatory agencies. The House of Delegates of the ABA
has adopted the more restrictive set of proposed amendments." 7
The most important provisions in the adopted model are DR 2101(A) and (B)," which specify the permissible content of an adver116. See ProposedAmendments, supra note 76, at 1.
117. 46 U.S.L.W. 2089 (Aug. 23, 1977).
118. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIoNAL RESPONSIBILrrY (as amended Aug. 1977). DR 2-101
provides in part:
(A) A lawyer shall not, on behalf of himself, his partner, associate or any other
lawyer affiliated with him or his firm, use or participate in the use of any form of public
communication containing a false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, self-laudatory or
unfair statement or claim.
(B) In order to facilitate the process of informed selection of a lawyer by potential
consumers of legal services, a lawyer may publish or broadcast, subject to DR 2-103, the
following information in print media distributed or over radio broadcasted in the geographic area or areas in which the lawyer resides or maintains offices or in which a
significant part of the lawyer's clientele resides, provided that the information disclosed
by the lawyer in such publication or broadcast complies with DR 2-101(A), and is
presented in a dignified manner:
(1) Name, including name of law firm and names of professional associates; addresses and telephone numbers;
(2) One or more fields of law in which the lawyer or law firm practices, a statement
that practice is limited to one or more fields of law, or a statement that the lawyer or
law firm specializes in a particular field of law practice, to the extent authorized under
DR 2-105;
(3) Date and place of birth;
(4) Date and place of admission to the bar of state and federal courts;
(5) Schools attended, with dates of graduation, degrees and other scholastic
distinctions;
(6) Public or quasi-public offices;
(7) Military service;
(8) Legal authorships;
(9) Legal teaching positions;
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tisement, the media through which it may be disseminated, and the
manner in which it may be presented. DR 2-101(A) proscribes, in
general terms, the dissemination of false, fraudulent, misleading,
deceptive, self-laudatory, or unfair statements or claims. DR 2101(B) delineates the categories of information that a lawyer may
permissibly publish. The unadopted proposal is less restrictive than
the adopted model. Under the unadopted version all information
that is not false, fraudulent, misleading, or deceptive would be authorized for publication."' Of particular relevance to the subject of
this Note are the provisions in the amendments relating to the use
of electronic media in attorney advertising. Both versions authorize
dignified radio advertising but expressly prohibit the use of televised advertising in the absence of a determination by appropriate
state authorities that televised advertising is necessary to provide
adequate information to consumers of legal services.120 The proposals disallow televised advertisements primarily because the Task
Force claimed that when the model amendments were drafted, it
(10)
(11)
(12)
(13)

Memberships, offices, and committee assignments, in bar associations;
Membership and offices in legal fraternities and legal societies;
Technical and professional licenses;
Memberships in scientific, technical and professional associations and socie-

ties;
(14) Foreign language ability;
(15) Names and addresses of bank references;
(16) With their written consent, names of clients regularly represented;
(17) Prepaid or group legal services programs in which the lawyer participates;
(18) Whether credit cards or other credit arrangements are accepted;
(19) Office and telephone answering service hours;
(20) Fee for an initial consultation;
(21) Availability upon request of a written schedule of fees and/or an estimate of
the fee to be charged for specific services;
(22) Contingent fee rates subject to DR 2-106(C), provided that the statement
discloses whether percentages are computed before or after deduction of costs;
(23) Range of fees for services, provided that the statement discloses that the
specific fee within the range which will be charged will vary depending upon the particular matter to be handled for each client and the client is entitled to without obligation
an estimate of the fee within the range likely to be charged, in print size equivalent to
the largest print used in setting forth the fee information;
(24) Hourly rate, provided that the statement discloses that the total fee charged
will depend upon the number of hours which must be devoted to the particular matter
to be handled for each client and the client is entitled to without obligation an estimate
of the fee likely to be charged, in print size at least equivalent to the largest print used
in setting forth the fee information;
(25) Fixed fees for specific legal services, the description of which would not be
misunderstood or be deceptive, provided that the statement discloses that the quoted
fee will be available only to clients whose matters fall into the services described and
that the client is entitled without obligation to a specific estimate of the fee likely to be
charged in print size at least equivalent to the largest print used in setting forth the fee
information.
119. See Proposed Amendments, supra note 76, at 2.
120. Id.

1979]

BROADCAST ATTORNEY ADVERTISING

775

lacked sufficient time and expertise to identify or fully evaluate all
potential problems or to develop appropriate and adequate regulations.121 It is significant, however, that the ABA has recognized that
televised attorney advertising could be essential to the bar's goal of
facilitating the dissemination of information relevant to the intelligent selection of counsel.
While an examination of the constitutional implications of the
restrictions imposed by the ABA amendments upon attorney advertising in general is beyond the scope of this Note,122 it is relevant for
present purposes to inquire into the constitutional implications of
the ABA's manner restrictions and its prohibition against televised
advertising. While the Bates Court did note that attorney advertisements may be permissibly subjected to time, place, and manner
regulations,'2 3 the regulations must not be designed to suppress
speech of particular content.12 The ABA's requirement that all advertisements, on radio and in print, must be presented in a dignified
manner,12r will withstand constitutional attack only if the purpose
of the restriction is to prevent harm unrelated to the idea communicated. If the requirement that advertisements be dignified is interpreted to apply to the content of the advertisement and utilized to
prevent certain ideas from being communicated, the regulation may
be deemed an impermissible suppression of speech. If, on the other
hand, the "dignified manner" restriction is found to be contentneutral and directed only at the manner in which the advertisement
is presented, then the regulation may be upheld as a legitimate
furtherance of the state's interest in preventing the commercialization of the profession and protecting consumer interests.
B. State Bar Associations
As a result of the Bates decision state bar associations have also
been faced with the tremendous challenge of formulating effective
rules and standards to protect the public from false or deceptive
attorney advertisements, while ensuring the free flow of truthful
information regarding legal services. Most state bar associations
have used the ABA proposals as guidelines and have amended their
own codes of professional responsibility to bring them into compliance with the Court's directive in Bates.126 Although the states gen121. Id.
122. For a general discussion of the constitutional implications of the ABA Proposed
Amendments, see 37 MD. L. REV. 350, 371-79 (1977).
123. 433 U.S. at 384.
124. See text accompanying notes 11-19 supra.
125. See note 118 supra.
126. In October 1978, the author of this Note wrote letters to the bar associations of
every state requesting information concerning the position taken by that particular state with
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erally appear to have adopted one or the other of the proposals with
only minor modifications, substantial departures have been made
from the ABA's position with regard to electronic media advertising.
A survey canvassing the positions taken by each of the state bar
associations on the issue of television and radio advertising"
yielded the following results: out of forty-six states for which information was available, only four had not amended the provisions
dealing with attorney advertising in their respective codes of professional ethics since the Bates decision.128 The survey also disclosed
that only six states have adopted the ABA's position with regard to
electronic media advertising and thus allow radio advertising but
prohibit televised attorney advertising. 2 Consequently, eighty percent of the states, on either a permanent or an interim basis, have
proposed to modify or already have modified the ABA's proposed
revisions of Canon Two pertaining to electronic media advertising,
with nineteen states allowing, or proposing to allow, advertising on
both radio and television,3 0 and seventeen prohibiting attorney advertising on the broadcast media entirely.' 3 '
The disparate treatment of radio and broadcast advertising
indicates that despite the Court's attempt to fashion a narrow decision in Bates, substantial discord remains as to the scope of the
holding. The interpretation ultimately adopted may hinge upon a
comparative analysis of the effects of the three different positions
adopted by the states: (1) a total ban on broadcast advertising; (2)
a partial ban under which only radio advertising is allowed; or (3)
the complete removal of a ban on attorney advertising over both
radio and television. It is unlikely that the Supreme Court will
render an authoritative decision or that the FTC will promulgate a
ruling absolutely prohibiting broadcast attorney advertising before
some sort of empirical evidence is available demonstrating the relaregard to the ABA's Proposed Amendments on attorney advertising. Specific inquiry was
made as to the state's position on advertising over the broadcast media. Thirty-nine state
bar associations responded. The data in this portion of the Note was compiled from the results
of this survey and the results of a survey by Daniel P. Hanley. See Hanley, Lawyer's Quirky
Ads Leave ABA With an Ethical Pain, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 13, 1978, at 19, col. 1.
127. See note 126 supra.
128. These states are Alabama, Hawaii, South Carolina, and South Dakota.
129. The states adopting the ABA's position are Indiana, Montana, Nebraska, New
Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Wyoming.
130. The states allowing attorney advertising on both radio and television are as follows:
Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Georgia, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Michigan,
Minnesota, Nevada, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Tennessee, Washington D.C., and
Wisconsin.
131. The states absolutely prohibiting broadcast attorney advertising include the following: Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Massachusetts,
Mississippi, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Utah, Vermont, and West Virginia.
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tive benefits and harms produced by attorney broadcast advertising.
Two of the factors that will probably be most determinative of
the ultimate effect of broadcast attorney advertising in those jurisdictions permitting such advertising are the nature and efficacy of
the restrictions specifying the manner in which broadcast advertisements must be presented. While many of the "manner" restrictions
have been promulgated by the states on an interim or temporary
basis, there is a wide disparity among the states in the degree of
restrictiveness of the regulations. For example, in Tennessee, where
attorney advertising is allowed over both television and radio, several restrictions have been adopted by the state bar to supplement
the radio broadcast regulations proposed by the ABA. In Tennessee
advertising over the broadcast media is limited to the reading of a
prepared text by an announcer.132 Television commercials, specifically, are to consist solely of a slide presentation accompanied by
13
The use of music or lyrics is strictly
dignified announcements."
prohibited.' Under no circumstances is any lawyer to appear personally on the broadcast media in connection with any commercial
advertising, nor may his photograph appear. 3 1 In North Carolina a
broadcast advertisement may not feature the lawyer's voice or portrait and "illustrations, animations, portrayals, dramatizations, slogans, music, lyrics and pictures" are expressly prohibited.13 1 The
Georgia State Bar Association has issued a regulation requiring that
a broadcast advertisement be identified as a paid advertisement. 3 7
Moreover, to facilitate enforcement of the regulatory scheme, an
advertising attorney is also required to send an audio tape recording
of the advertisement to the general counsel of the State Bar of
Georgia. 3
In other states permitting lawyer advertising over radio and
television, little, if any, "special consideration" by way of supplementing the restrictions proposed by the ABA has been given to the
"special problems" of advertising over the broadcast media. Within
these jurisdictions, the type of advertisements feared by opponents
132. Amendments to Code of ProfessionalResponsibility, 14 TENN. B.J. 47, 51-52 (May
1978).
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Amendments to DR 2-101(B), Art. X, Canon 2, The Canons of Ethics and Rules
of Professional Conduct of the Certificate of Organization of the North Carolina State Bar
(1978) (copy on file with the Vanderbilt Law Review).
137. Amendments to the Rules and Regulations for the Organization and Government
of the State Bar of Georgia, by Order of the Supreme Court of Georgia (May 12, 1978) (copy
on file with the Vanderbilt Law Review).
138. Id.
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of attorney advertising has surfaced-those that tend to attract the
consumer's attention by use of showmanship, self-laudation, or
hucksterism, typically by use of dramatizations, slogans, jingles, or
other sensational language or format.'* While these practices are
deplored by a large segment of the profession, their disentitlement
to constitutional protection has not been established. The ultimate
constitutional status of regulations on broadcast attorney advertising promulgated by the bar at the state level will depend upon the
relative weight of the interests at issue. The regulations that have
been formulated represent efforts by the bar to protect the consumer
and maintain the dignity of the profession, while satisfying the requirements of the first amendment. Although it is still too early to
quantify the benefits or the harms of attorney broadcast advertising, developments at the state level should be carefully monitored
for they may ultimately provide the indicia necessary to determine
the extent to which broadcast attorney advertising requires first
amendment protection.
IV.

EFFECT OF BROADCAST

ATORNEY

ADVERTISING ON THE LEGAL

PROFESSION

A. Regulation of Attorney Advertising by the FTC
The FTC has been authorized by section five of the Federal
Trade Commission Act 40 to regulate commercial activity to protect
the consumer from unfair or deceptive acts or practices. When the
ban on attorney advertising was removed and lawyers began advertising, the organized bar, traditionally a self-regulating entity, became potentially subject to the regulatory powers of the FTC. While
no cases have addressed the extent to which the FTC has jurisdiction over the commercial practices of the bar, precedent indicates
that the FTC would have jurisdiction under sections four and five
of the FTC Act. Section four enumerates the entities that may be
regulated by the FTC, including any association "organized to carry
on business for its own profit or that of its members.""' Section five
requires that the acts or practices regulated be "in or affecting commerce."'
The Supreme Court in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar13 determined that certain attorney activities may affect interstate commerce so as to bring regulation of the legal profession, at least in
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

For an example of attorney advertising of this nature, see Hanley, supra note 126.
15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1976 & Supp. 1978).
Id. § 44 (1976).
Id. § 45(a)(1) (Supp. 1978).
421 U.S. 773 (1975).
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part, within the FTC's jurisdiction through the Sherman Act.'" In
recognizing the FTC's jurisdiction over the anti-competitive practice of setting minimum fee schedules for title-searching services
provided by attorneys, the Court noted that frequently the practice
of law entails the making of decisions in one state that significantly
affect commercial transactions in others."' That the FTC is ready
to assert authority over advertising practices of professionals is suggested by the decision in The American Medical Association,'" in
which a FTC administrative law judge held that restrictions on
physician advertising appearing in the ethical codes of several medical associations constitute unfair methods of competition and unfair
acts or practices violative of section five of the FTC Act.' 7 The judge
in that case rejected the contention that the FTC lacked jurisdiction
over medical associations, finding that the associations were a
"4company . . . or association . . . organized to carry on business for

its own profits or that of its members" as required by section four
of the act."' Moreover, he found the associations' acts or practices
to be "in or affecting commerce" as required by section five." Two
conclusions flowing almost inexorably from this decision are that
the FTC also may assert jurisdiction over the commercial practices
of the legal profession and may prescribe regulations identifying the
types of attorney advertising that will be permitted under section
five of the act.
The body of law established by the FTC has been developed to
regulate product advertising in a commercial setting in which the
sale of that product represents the entirety of the transaction between the advertiser and the consumer. Legal service advertising
introduces many new considerations, different in both nature and
degree from product advertising. For example, in legal advertising
the ultimate purpose of a commercial is not the initial contact between the consumer and the advertising attorney, but rather is the
development of an ensuing attorney-client relationship. Furthermore, because the public lacks sophistication regarding the purchase of legal services, different standards and regulations would
need to be formulated to prevent misunderstanding and deception.
In addition, satisfactory rendition of an advertised service is more
difficult to test than is the performance of an advertised product.
144. 15 U.S.C. H§ 1-7 (1976 & Supp. 1978).
145. 421 U.S. at 783-84.
146.
1978).
147.
148.
149.

The American Medical Association, 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 1 21,491 (Nov. 13,
Id.
Id.
Id.
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New methods of detection of fraud or deception by advertising attorneys would inevitably be necessitated. These and the many other
problems presented by an attempt to regulate attorney advertising
may discourage the FTC from actively asserting authority over the
commercial practices of the legal profession at present. The goal of
the organized bar and that of the FTC is the same-the dissemination of information to the public without deception. If the organized
bar can achieve those goals effectively through self-regulation, then
the FTC may prefer to leave the regulation of attorney advertising
in the hands of the bar.
B. General Implications
Broadcast attorney advertising is too recent a phenomenon for
the legal profession to have felt its impact to any significant degree,
yet speculation is possible as to the ultimate effects broadcast advertising will have on the legal services industry. Among the salutary effects that broadcast attorney advertising may be expected to
have for the profession is an increase in demand for routine legal
services.s 0 Surveys have indicated that the judicial machinery remains underutilized by large segments of the population. 5' This
underutilization of legal services has been attributed to the consumer's inability to find qualified attorneys and the fear of prohibitively high costs.'5 2 Price advertising by attorneys should promote
the utilization of legal services by encouraging the assertion of valid
claims. One of the most remarkable manifestations of the effect of
advertising is the widespread development of legal clinics."' Advertising has allowed a restructuring of the traditional method of rendering legal services. The increase in demand for routine legal services brought about by advertising has allowed attorneys to provide
legal services in volume and at lower rates. The benefits of advertising thus inure to both the consumer, who is able to obtain legal
services at lower rates, and to the attorney, whose business is enhanced. In addition, broadcast advertising may facilitate the new
lawyer's entry into an established legal market.'
Another beneficial effect of broadcast price advertising is that
it is likely to reduce the public's disillusionment with the profes150.
377 n.35.
151.
152.
153.
26, 1978,
154.

This possible effect is recognized by the Supreme Court in Bates. See 433 U.S. at
See text accompanying note 82 supra.
See text accompanying notes 83-85 supra.
See Roberts, A New Breed of Lawyer Born of Advertisements, N.Y. Times, Nov.
at 26, col. 2.
See 433 U.S. at 378.
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sion."5 Much of the public's antipathy toward the bar stems from
the bar's failure to reach out to those whom they purport to serve.
Price advertising would at least demonstrate that attorneys are
more concerned with the delivery of their services than with preventing competition within the profession.
Whether broadcast attorney advertising will commercialize the
profession to its detriment remains to be seen, and whether the risk
of overreaching and misrepresentation by unscrupulous attorneys
outweighs the benefit of the communication of truthful information
regarding legal services can only be determined with time. Only one
conclusion can at present be made with certainty: broadcast attorney advertising will accelerate any impact to be felt by the profession as a result of legal service advertising.
V. CONCLUSION
In the wake of the limited constitutional holding in Bates, state
courts must determine for themselves the degree of first amendment
protection to be accorded broadcast attorney advertising. Many
state bar associations, state regulatory authorities, and individual
members of the bar maintain that advertisement over the electronic
media should not be considered a constitutional right. Conversely,
others contend that to prohibit the transmission of legal service
information over the broadcast media is effectively to deny a significant portion of the public their first amendment right to receive
information pertaining to their personal welfare.
Although a state by virtue of its police power may place various
restrictions on commercial speech, in order to do so it must be able
to demonstrate an interest outweighing the advertisement's contribution to the public welfare. The public's strong first amendment
interest in and right to information regarding the acquisition of legal
services and the broadcast media's demonstrated superiority in
communicating information to the public should ultimately be
found to outweigh the state's interest in preserving the dignity of the
profession and in preventing speculative harm to the public by misrepresentation caused by broadcast advertising. The state's interest
in a total ban on attorney advertising over the broadcast media is
diminished in view of the existing laws against fraud and malpractice and the ethical rules prohibiting an attorney from taking a case
in which he cannot do a competent job. Furthermore, reasonable
regulations of commercial speech are constitutionally sanctioned
and can be formulated to protect the public from potential harm by
155. Branca & Steinberg, Attorney Fee Schedules and Legal Advertising: The Implications of Goldfarb, 24 U.C.L.A. L. Rzv. 475, 516-17 (1977).
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broadcast advertising. In balance, the public's right to receive information relevant to the nature, terms, and availability of legal services requires extension of constitutional protection to attorney advertising over the most effective and pervasive communication
media-the broadcast media.
I. TERRY CURRIE

